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Abstract
Collaborative transportation can significantly reduce transportation costs as well as greenhouse
gas emissions. However, allocating the cost to the collaborating companies remains difficult. We
consider the cost-allocation problem which arises when companies, each with multiple delivery
locations, collaborate by consolidating demand and combining delivery routes. We model the
corresponding cost-allocation problem as a cooperative game: the joint network vehicle routing
game (JNVRG). We propose a row generation algorithm to determine a core allocation for the
JNVRG. In this approach, we encounter a row generation subproblem which we model as a new
variant of a vehicle routing problem with profits. Moreover, we propose two main acceleration
strategies for the row generation algorithm. First, we generate rows by relaxing the row gen-
eration subproblem, exploiting the tight LP bounds for our formulation of the row generation
subproblem. Secondly, we propose to also solve the row generation subproblem heuristically
and to only solve it to optimality when the heuristic fails. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed row generation algorithm and the acceleration strategies by means of numerical
experiments for both the JNVRG as well as the traditional vehicle routing game, which is a
special case of the JNVRG. We create and solve instances based on benchmark instances of the
capacitated vehicle routing problem from the literature, ranging from 5 companies with a total
of 79 delivery locations to 53 companies with a total of 53 delivery locations.
Keywords: Collaborative transportation, Cooperative game theory, Vehicle Routing, Row generation, Vehicle
routing with profits, Branch-and-cut-and-price
1 Introduction
Consider a company which operates a distribution network with multiple delivery locations. The
delivery locations are served by a fleet of vehicles from a central depot. Often, multiple of these
distribution networks are located within the same area. For example, consider several retailers
operating within the same city centres. Close proximity of their delivery locations provides
companies with the opportunity to collaborate. Such collaborations can consist of consolidating
demands and combining delivery routes, effectively joining their distribution networks. In over
ten case studies with real life data (Guajardo and Rönnqvist, 2016), collaborative transportation
provides potential cost savings ranging from 4% (Lehoux et al., 2011) to 46% (Engevall et al.,
2004). Moreover, Ballot and Fontane (2010) report a reduction in CO2 emissions by at least
25% as a consequence of collaborative transportation.
Despite the potential benefits, many collaboration opportunities are left unused in practice.
One reason is that the remaining cost after collaboration still needs to be divided among the
companies. Reaching an agreement can be difficult as the concerned distribution networks are
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likely to have different characteristics. For example, each company may have a different number
of delivery locations and the demand volumes may differ as well. Nonetheless, all routing costs
need to be allocated to the companies. In this paper, we study the cost allocation problem which
arises from collaborative transportation of multiple companies, each having multiple delivery
locations.
In various settings, cost allocation problems are modelled as cooperative games, see Guajardo
and Rönnqvist (2016) for an overview of cooperative games in transportation. In cooperative
game terminology, it is common to refer to the companies as players, and to refer to a group
of players as a coalition. A cooperative game is characterised by a set of players, known as the
grand-coalition, and a cost function which maps each coalition to a specific cost. The goal of a
cooperative game is to allocate the cost of the grand-coalition to the players. To this end, it is
common to look for a so-called core allocation. A core allocation ensures that each coalition is
worse off if they decide not to cooperate in the grand-coalition. The set of all such allocations
is known as the core.
Among the first collaborative transportation games is the travelling salesman game (TSG),
in which each player corresponds to a single delivery location and all deliveries are made on a
single distribution route. The cost of a coalition is defined as the optimal objective value of
a travelling salesman problem (TSP). See Applegate et al. (2006) for more on the TSP. The
TSG was originally proposed by Fishburn and Pollak (1983), and the core of the TSG has been
studied by Dror (1990) and Potters et al. (1992). For a case study on the TSG, we refer the
reader to Engevall et al. (1998), who determine core allocations for a single instance consisting
of 5 players.
The vehicle routing game (VRG) is a generalisation of the TSG, where each player is assumed
to have a certain demand which has to be satisfied by a fleet of vehicles with finite capacity. For
the VRG, the cost of a coalition is given by the optimal objective value of a capacitated vehicle
routing problem (CVRP). See Toth and Vigo (2014) for more on the CVRP. The problem of
determining a core allocation for the VRG has been studied by Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996),
who present numerical experiments for instances with at most 25 players. Furthermore, Engevall
et al. (2004) consider the VRG with a heterogeneous fleet and solve a single instance consisting
of 21 players.
In order to determine a core allocation, the core is often modelled as a linear programming
problem consisting of an exponential number of constraints, one for each coalition. For a small
number of players, we might include all constraints and determine the cost for each coalition.
Clearly, if the number of players is large or if computing the cost of a coalition is computationally
expensive, this approach is no longer tractable. For example, in the TSG, a TSP has to be
considered for each coalition, which is an NP-hard problem. Similarly, in the VRG, exponentially
many CVRPs are considered. Note that computationally the CVRP seems more difficult than
the TSP, since benchmark instances for the CVRP with up to 360 customers can be solved to
optimality by state-of-the-art algorithms (Pecin et al., 2017a), whereas benchmark instances of
up to 85900 customers have been solved to optimality for the TSP (Applegate et al., 2006).
Interestingly, Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996) show that in order to describe the core of the
VRG, only coalitions which can be served on a single distribution route have to be considered.
As a result, one can solve a TSP instead of a CVRP to compute the cost of any relevant coalition.
However, as the number of coalitions remains large, Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996) propose a row
generation algorithm to determine a core allocation. In their approach they assume that the core
is non-empty. As a consequence, the row generation subproblem they encounter simplifies, and
can be modelled as a travelling salesman problem with profits. Engevall et al. (2004) propose a
row generation algorithm to determine the Nucleolus of a VRG with heterogeneous fleet, even if
the core is empty. They show that the row generation subproblem in this case can be modelled as
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a vehicle routing problem with profits. However, the authors do not propose a method to solve
their row generation subproblem. Instead, they illustrate the effectiveness of the row generation
generation technique in an instance with 21 players by enumerating the CVRP cost of over 2
million coalitions, for which they report a runtime of roughly 12 weeks.
In contrast to the TSG and VRG where each player corresponds to a single delivery location,
in many real-life applications, each company has multiple delivery locations. In the following, we
consider cooperative transportation games in which each player corresponds to multiple delivery
locations. Krajewska et al. (2008) and Dai and Chen (2015) consider a cooperative game in which
each player has a set of delivery requests. In that case, an order has to be collected from a pickup
location before it is delivered. Krajewska et al. (2008) define the cost as the objective value of
applying a heuristic to the pickup-and-delivery problem. The authors enumerate the cost for
each coalition, and determine the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for instances consisting of 5
players, each with 50 delivery requests. For each allocation they also determine whether it is
in the core of their game. As opposed to Krajewska et al. (2008), Dai and Chen (2015) define
the cost as the optimal objective value to the pickup-and-delivery problem. They propose a row
generation algorithm to determine a core allocation for the game. To this end, they formulate
both the pickup-and-delivery problem and the row generation subproblem as MIPs, and use a
general purpose MIP solver to solve these problems. Dai and Chen (2015) consider instances
consisting of at most 5 players and 25 requests. For half of the instances consisting of 5 players,
it took them over 12 hours to compute a core allocation.
To the best of our knowledge, the setting of Zakharov and Shchegryaev (2015) is closest to
our work. The authors consider a setting in which each player is responsible for multiple delivery
locations. Given a coalition, they determine the cost by heuristically solving a CVRP consisting
of the delivery locations of the players in the coalition. Based on these heuristic costs, they
determine a core allocation for an instance consisting of 4 players and 200 delivery locations by
enumerating all coalitions.
Contrary to Zakharov and Shchegryaev (2015), we define the cost of a coalition as the
optimal solution to a CVRP over the delivery locations of the players in the coalition. We call
the corresponding cooperative game the joint network vehicle routing game (JNVRG). We define
the cost as the optimal value for the following two reasons. First, a core allocation determined
by heuristic costs instead of optimal costs may not be stable in practice. A coalition might be
able to improve on the heuristic solution which could correspond to a cost that is lower than
what is allocated. Secondly, when the cost of a coalition is determined by a heuristic, it is not
clear how to find a core allocation without enumerating all coalitions. As a result, cooperative
games using heuristic costs do not scale well for a large number of players. Alternatively, using
optimal objective values allows for the application of row generation. The trade off is that more
players can be considered while the number of delivery locations will be limited.
Our main contribution is as follows. We propose a row generation algorithm to determine
core allocations for the JNVRG. In our solution approach, we encounter a row generation sub-
problem which we model as a generalisation of a vehicle routing problem with profits, which to
our best knowledge has not been studied before. Furthermore, we propose two main acceleration
strategies for the row generation algorithm. First, we introduce what we call coarse row gener-
ation, a technique where we exploit the tight bounds of the set-partitioning formulation of the
CVRP. In particular, we relax the row generation subproblem to accelerate the identification of
violated core constraints. Secondly, we solve the row generation subproblem heuristically before
using an exact algorithm in order to limit the number of times the row generation subproblem
has to be solved to optimality. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
row generation algorithm by means of numerical experiments. We are able to solve instances
ranging from 5 players and 79 delivery locations to 53 players and 53 delivery locations within 2
3
hours of computation time. Moreover, we demonstrate that the proposed acceleration strategies
are also effective for the VRG.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the JNVRG.
Next, in Section 3 we propose a row generation algorithm to determine a core allocation in
an efficient manner. We present several existing acceleration strategies for solving the row
generation subproblem in Section 4. In Section 5 we propose new acceleration strategies for the
row generation algorithm. Our computational results are presented and discussed in Section 6.
Finally, we provide some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research in Section 7.
2 The Joint Network Vehicle Routing Game
In order to formally introduce the JNVRG, we first define the CVRP. Consider a complete
directed graph G = (V,A). The vertex set V is defined as {0}∪V ′, where 0 represents the depot
and V ′ represents the set of all delivery locations, also referred to as customers. With each
arc (v, w) ∈ A, a travel cost cvw ≥ 0 is associated, which we assume to adhere to the triangle
inequality. Furthermore, each customer v ∈ V ′ has a demand dv > 0. An unlimited number of
vehicles with capacity Q is available at the depot to satisfy the demand by visiting customers
along routes. A route is defined as a simple cycle, starting and ending at the depot, such that
the total demand does not exceed the capacity. We assume that dv ≤ Q for all v ∈ V ′. The
CVRP is the problem of constructing routes in such a way that the total cost is minimised and
every customer is visited exactly once.
Next, we define the JNVRG. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. The set V ′ is
the combined set of the customers of these players. In particular, V ′(i) ⊂ V ′ represents the
customers of player i where ⋃i∈N V ′(i) = V ′ and V ′(i) ∩ V ′(j) = ∅ for i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. The
cost C(S) of coalition S ⊆ N is the minimal cost of the CVRP on the subgraph G(S) induced
by V ′(S)∪ {0}, where V ′(S) = ⋃i∈S V ′(i) represents all customers of the players in coalition S.
We define the JNVRG as an n-person cooperative game 〈N,C〉, where the aim is to allocate the
cost C(N) to the players.
2.1 Characterisation of the core
As is common in cooperative game theory, we search for an allocation in the core. In order
to define the core, we denote the cost allocated to player i as yi and the cost allocated to
the coalition S ⊆ N as y(S) = ∑i∈S yi. A cost allocation y ∈ Rn is said to be efficient if
y(N) = C(N). Furthermore, a cost allocation is said to be rational if it satisfies the rationality
constraints y(S) ≤ C(S) for all coalitions S ⊂ N . The rationality constraints ensure that no
coalition has an incentive not to cooperate. The set of rational and efficient cost allocations is
known as the core (Gillies, 1959) and is described as
Core(〈N,C〉) = {y ∈ Rn : y(S) ≤ C(S) ∀S ⊂ N, y(N) = C(N)}.
If no rational and efficient cost allocation exists, the core is said to be empty. The core of
the JNVRG is related to the core of the VRG, since the VRG is a special case of the JNVRG
in which each player has exactly one customer. Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996) show that for
the VRG there exist instances with an empty core. Because the VRG is a special case of the
JNVRG, we conclude that there also exist instances of the JNVRG for which the core is empty.
One way to determine whether the core of a specific JNVRG instance is non-empty is by
applying the Bondareva-Shapley theorem of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967). This theorem
states that the core of a game is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. For convenience,
we define balancedness by means of an optimisation problem. A game is said to be balanced
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if and only if C(N) is smaller than or equal to the optimal objective value C∗ of the following
minimisation problem:
C∗ = min
∑
S⊂N
xSC(S) (2.1)
s.t.
∑
S⊂N
αiSxS = 1 ∀ i ∈ N, (2.2)
xS ≥ 0 ∀ S ⊂ N, (2.3)
where xS is a non-negative decision variable providing the amount by which coalition S is
selected and αiS is a binary parameter which equals 1 if and only if i ∈ S.
Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996) implicitly use the Bondareva-Shapley theorem to determine
whether the core of a VRG is non-empty. To do so, they make use of so-called feasible coalitions,
which they define as coalitions of which the delivery locations can be visited on a single distribu-
tion route. They show that the cost of a non-feasible coalition is precisely the sum of the costs
of the feasible coalitions corresponding to each route which is part of an optimal solution for the
CVRP of the non-feasible coalition. As a result, only feasible coalitions have to be considered
to describe the core, and all other coalitions can be disregarded. In this case, the computation
of the cost of a coalition reduces to solving a TSP instead of a CVRP.
When only considering feasible coalitions, (2.1)-(2.3) reduces to the LP-relaxation of the
set-partitioning formulation of the CVRP of the grand-coalition, in which the variable xS corre-
sponds to a single route. Moreover, it follows that C∗ = C(N) if and only if the LP-relaxation
of the set-partitioning formulation of the CVRP of the grand-coalition has an integer optimal
solution. Interestingly, it follows that by solving the LP-relaxation of the set-partitioning for-
mulation of a CVRP, one can determine whether the core of the VRG is non-empty.
A similar result does not hold for the JNVRG, as coalitions which are served by multiple
vehicles cannot be disregarded. This is because in contrast to the VRG, the customers of a single
player might be visited on multiple routes. Therefore, we cannot determine a core allocation
by only considering TSPs for a limited set of coalitions, instead we consider a CVRP for all
coalitions.
These results also provide insight into how often one can expect a VRG core to be empty. It
is well known that many CVRP instances do not have an integer solution to the LP-relaxation
of the set-partitioning formulation. Hence, we can expect the core of the VRG to be empty
quite often. This expectation does not directly apply to the JNVRG. To see this, construct an
instance of the JNVRG by combining multiple players of the VRG into single players of the
JNVRG. This means that the delivery locations of a single player in the JNVRG are in fact
the combined delivery locations of multiple players of the VRG. Observe that the rationality
constraints of this instance of the JNVRG are a subset of the rationality constraints of the VRG.
Hence, the JNVRG is a restricted game with respect to the VRG, see Faigle (1989) for more
on restricted games. As a result, the core of a VRG is contained in the core of a corresponding
JNVRG. Put differently, if the core of the VRG is empty, this does not imply that the core of a
corresponding JNVRG is empty, although the reverse implication does hold.
2.2 Cost allocation
Well-known allocations are the Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), the Lorenz allocation (Arin, 2003)
and the allocation given by the Equal Profit Method (EPM) of Frisk et al. (2010). All of these
allocations can be found by solving linear programming problems that include all rationality
constraints. In this paper, we use the EPM allocation for illustrative purposes, although our
proposed approach could easily be applied to find other allocations as well.
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An EPM allocation is a core allocation which minimises the maximum difference in allocated
cost to each player, relative to their individual cost. The EPM allocation y can be determined
by solving the linear programming problem:
min θ (2.4)
s.t. yi
C({i}) −
yj
C({j}) ≤ θ ∀ i, j ∈ N, (2.5)
y(S) ≤ C(S) ∀S ⊂ N, (2.6)
y(N) = C(N), (2.7)
yi ≥ 0 i ∈ V ′, (2.8)
θ ∈ R. (2.9)
In an optimal solution, the maximum difference in relative costs is given by the decision variable θ
as enforced by Constraints (2.5). The rationality constraints (2.6) and efficiency constraint (2.7)
ensure that the allocation is in the core. Like Frisk et al. (2010), we include Constraints (2.8).
However, note that due to the monotonicity of the costs of each coalition, these constraints
are implied by the rationality constraints. Finally, Constraint (2.9) specifies the domain of the
decision variable θ.
3 A row generation algorithm
We determine an EPM allocation for the JNVRG by solving (2.4)-(2.9). The inclusion of the
rationality constraints (2.6) poses two challenges. First, there are exponentially many of these
constraints. Second, to determine the cost of a coalition, a CVRP has to be solved, which
is known to be NP-hard (Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan, 1981). To alleviate both challenges, we
propose a row generation method in which these constraints are first omitted and then iteratively
generated if they are violated. This approach is similar to the approach presented by Göthe-
Lundgren et al. (1996) and Engevall et al. (2004), but differs in the row generation subproblem.
We first present the general idea of the row generation algorithm which we use to determine
an EPM allocation. An initial cost allocation y is obtained by solving (2.4)-(2.9) with (2.6) only
for the singleton coalitions. Note that the non-negativity constraints (2.8) are no longer implied
in the absence of some rationality constraints, which is why we explicitly include them. Next, a
row generation subproblem is solved to determine whether there exists a coalition for which the
rationality constraint is violated by the current allocation y. If a violated rationality constraint
is identified, the constraint is added to the relaxed problem. This procedure is repeated until
no more violated constraints can be identified, indicating that the solution is optimal, or the
problem becomes infeasible, indicating that the core is empty.
In the remainder of this section we present the row generation algorithm in more detail. A
description of the row generation subproblem is given in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we propose
a branch-and-price algorithm to solve the row generation subproblem.
3.1 The row generation subproblem
Consider a cost allocation y. A violated rationality constraint is characterised by a coalition
S ⊂ N such that y(S) > C(S). This gives rise to the following row generation subproblem:
SP(y) = max
S⊂N
{y(S)− C(S)} . (3.1)
If we find that the optimal objective value SP(y) > 0 a violated rationality constraint has been
identified, otherwise the current allocation is an EPM allocation. Note that the routing costs
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C(S) of the potentially violating coalitions have not been determined, and are also part of the
row generation subproblem.
Next, we introduce an integer programming formulation for the row generation subproblem.
Let R denote the set of feasible routes in G(N). Define the coefficient avr as the number of
times customer v is included in route r, hence avr = 0 if customer v is not included in r and
avr = 1 if customer v is included exactly once in r. We define the binary decision variable zi
such that zi = 1 if and only if player i is included in the selected coalition, which we denote by
S(z) = {i ∈ N : zi = 1}. Furthermore, let i(v) denote the player corresponding to customer v.
Define the binary decision variable xr such that xr = 1 if and only if route r is selected. Let cr
be the cost of route r which is given by the sum of the arc costs on route r. We can formulate
the row generation subproblem as follows:
GCPTP(y) = max
∑
i∈N
yizi −
∑
r∈R
crxr (3.2)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
avrxr ≥ zi(v) ∀ v ∈ V ′, (3.3)
xr ∈ {0, 1} ∀ r ∈ R, (3.4)
zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i ∈ N. (3.5)
Objective (3.2) represents the amount by which the rationality constraint of the selected coalition
S(z) is violated. Constraints (3.3) enforce that all locations of a player are visited at least once
if the player is included in the selected coalition. Finally, Constraints (3.4) and (3.5) specify the
domains of the decision variables.
Consider an optimal solution (x∗, z∗). In this case, x∗ is an optimal solution to the CVRP
of coalition S(z∗). Hence, after solving the row generation subproblem, the optimal routing
cost of the most violated coalition has also been determined, and the corresponding rationality
constraint y(S(z∗)) ≤ C(S(z∗)) can directly be added to the relaxed problem without having to
solve an additional CVRP.
The row generation subproblem can be seen as a generalisation of a capacitated profitable
tour problem (CPTP) as studied by Archetti et al. (2013). In the CPTP not all customers need
to be visited whereas a prize is collected for customers which are visited. The goal of the CPTP
is to maximise the collected prizes minus the CVRP cost C(S). Our row generation subproblem
is a generalisation of the CPTP such that a prize yi is collected if and only if all locations V ′(i)
of player i are visited. We call this modified problem the grouped capacitated profitable tour
problem (GCPTP).
3.2 Solving the row generation subproblem
In order to determine an optimal solution to the row generation subproblem, we propose a
branch-and-price algorithm. In each node of the branch-and-bound tree we determine an upper
bound for the row generation subproblem by solving the linear relaxation of (3.2)-(3.5), referred
to as the master problem (MP). Since the number of route variables xr is high, we apply
column generation to solve the MP in each node. To this end, we define the restricted master
problem (RMP) as the MP in which we restrict the set of variables. Then, we solve the RMP and
search for any positive reduced cost variables by solving a pricing problem, which we introduce
next. If such variables are found, they are added to the RMP and the process is repeated. If
no more positive reduced cost variables exist, the solution to the RMP is also optimal for the
MP and gives a valid upper bound for the row generation subproblem. Finally, if a solution is
fractional, we branch on either fractional player variables or fractional arc flows.
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3.2.1 The pricing problem
The pricing problem is the problem of identifying a positive reduced cost variable. In most
CVRP literature employing column generation, the pricing problem is a minimisation problem
to identify a negative reduced cost variable. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid confusion, we
reverse the sign of the reduced cost and model the pricing problem as a minimisation problem
as well, and search for negative reduced cost variables.
In order to guarantee optimality of the RMP, we must show that no routes with negative
reduced cost exist. The reduced cost c¯r of a route r can be expressed as the sum over the
modified arc costs c¯vw:
c¯vw = cvw − µv + µw2 , v, w ∈ V
′ ∪ {0} (3.6)
where µv ≥ 0 is a dual variable associated with Constraints (3.3) and µ0 = 0. We view the
pricing problem as an Elementary Shortest Path Problem with Capacity Constraints (ESPPCC)
in the graph G(N) with the modified arc cost. To efficiently solve the ESPPCC, Label-setting
algorithms are often used. In the following we present a label-setting algorithm, which is similar
to that of Martinelli et al. (2014).
A partial path in G(N) starting at the depot and ending at vertex v ∈ V ′∪{0} is represented
by a label λ which is defined as follows:
λ = (v, C,D,U) . (3.7)
Here, C is the cost of the partial path, the load D is the demand satisfied by the partial path
and U is a binary vector consisting of entries Uw which indicate whether the partial path may
be extended to vertex w ∈ V (N)∪ {0}. As proposed by Feillet et al. (2004), the entry Uw is set
to 1 if vertex w has already been visited by the partial path or if the capacity constraint does
not allow vertex w to be visited. The extension λ′ of a partial path λ = (v, C,D,U) from vertex
v to vertex w is determined as
λ′ = (w,C + c¯vw, D + dw, f(U)) , (3.8)
where the resources U are updated by a function f(U) : B|V ′| → B|V ′|. For w′ ∈ V (N) ∪ {0}
such that w′ 6= w, fw′(U) equals 1 if and only if Uw′ = 1 or D + dw + dw′ > Q. Furthermore,
fw(U) equals 1.
Next, we present a dominance rule to limit the number of partial paths which have to be
considered. Consider two distinct labels λ = (v, C,D,U) and λ′ = (v, C ′, D′, U ′), both with
end vertex v. If every completion of the partial path corresponding to λ′ leads to a worse
solution than the same completion of λ we say that λ dominates λ′, in which case label λ′ can
be disregarded. Label λ dominates λ′ if the following conditions hold:
C ≤ C ′, (3.9)
D ≤ D′, (3.10)
U ≤ U ′. (3.11)
For efficient implementation, we make use of the fact that demand is integer in the benchmark
that instances we use and keep labels in buckets B(v, q) based on the end vertex v ∈ V ′ and load
q ∈ {0, . . . , Q}. We store the labels sorted on reduced cost to reduce the number of times we
have to verify criterion (3.9). Initially, label (0, 0, 0,0) is added to bucket B(0, 0), the remaining
buckets are initialised as empty. Then, in increasing order of load all partial paths are extended
to neighbouring nodes. After the extension of a label, the dominance rule is utilised to verify if
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the extended label dominates any of the existing labels with equal load q and end vertex v, if
this is the case, the label is stored in bucket B(v, q). Any existing labels which are dominated
in the process are removed from the bucket. If no labels are dominated by the extended label,
we verify if any of the existing labels dominate the extended label. If none of the existing labels
dominate the extended label, it is added to the corresponding bucket B(v, q).
Each negative reduced cost label included in a bucket associated to the depot corresponds
to a negative reduced cost route. After the algorithm has been executed, the best ρE found
negative reduced cost routes are added to the RMP.
3.2.2 Branching strategy
The optimal solution to the MP may be fractional. We propose a branching scheme to obtain
an optimal integer solution. First, we branch on the sum of the variables zi. Then, we branch
on the most fractional zi, i.e., the zi which value is closest to 12 . If all zi are integer, we branch
on the number of vehicles used. Finally, we branch on the most fractional arc flow. Here we use
the well-known result that integer arc flows also correspond to integer routes. When choosing a
node to branch on, we consider the node with the highest upper bound.
4 Acceleration strategies for solving the subproblem
In the following, we discuss several acceleration strategies from the CVRP literature and apply
them in our algorithm for the row generation subproblem which we model as a GCPTP. First,
in Section 4.1 we describe ng-route relaxation (Baldacci et al., 2011) for the row generation
subproblem in order to reduce the computational effort required to solve the pricing problem.
Second, in Section 4.2 we describe decremental state space relaxation (Martinelli et al., 2014)
to further accelerate the label-setting algorithm. In Section 4.3, we present a heuristic for the
pricing problem. Finally, in Section 4.4 we describe the limited memory subset-row cuts (Pecin
et al., 2017a) which we use to improve the LP bound of the MP.
4.1 ng-Routes
The formulation of the row generation subproblem is relaxed by allowing non-elementary routes,
originally applied by Desrochers et al. (1992). Note that this does not alter the optimal objec-
tive value as it is never better to visit a customer multiple times. The benefit of allowing
non-elementary routes is that it reduces the computational effort required to solve the pricing
problem. However, this comes at the expense of weaker LP bounds. We consider a subset of
non-elementary routes known as ng-routes, which were introduced by Baldacci et al. (2011) and
typically provide a good trade-off between weaker LP bounds and reduced computation times
for the pricing problem. An ng-route is defined as a route which is allowed to visit a vertex v
multiple times, if and only if, between the visits, at least one vertex v′ is visited such that
v /∈ Πv′ , where Πv′ ⊆ V ′ represents the ng-neighbourhood of vertex v′.
We implement ng-routes by altering the label-setting algorithm. We modify the definition of
a label such that at vertex v we only keep track of whether the label can be extended towards the
vertices in the ng-neighbourhood Πv. It is assumed that a label can be extended to all vertices
not in its neighbourhood, if this does not violate the capacity constraints. When extending a
label from vertex v to vertex w we update the label according to (3.8) except for the binary
vector U , which is updated according to f ′(U). For w′ ∈ V ′ such that w′ 6= w , f ′w′(U) equals 1
if and only if D + dw + dw′ > Q or w′ ∈ Πw and Uw′ = 1. Moreover, f ′w(U) equals 1. Finally,
we alter the dominance rule as follows. We say that a label λ = (v, C,D,U) dominates another
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label λ′ = (v, C ′, D′, U ′) if the following condition
Uw ≤ U ′w for w ∈ Πv (4.1)
holds along with conditions (3.9)-(3.10).
4.2 Decremental State Space Relaxation
To reduce the size of the ng-neighbourhoods, we apply decremental state space relaxation as
proposed by Martinelli et al. (2014), which is demonstrated to be effective at improving the
computational performance of label-setting algorithms. To this end, we execute the label-setting
algorithm with auxiliary ng-neighbourhoods Γv instead of the real ng-neighbourhoods Πv for
each vertex v ∈ V ′. Each time we solve a MP, the neighbourhood Γv is initialised as {v} for
all v ∈ V ′. If the algorithm identifies a negative reduced cost route r, which is not an ng-route
with respect to the neighbourhoods Πv = V ′, the neighbourhoods Γv are updated as follows.
For each cycle in r which is not allowed, vertex v is added to the neighbourhoods of all vertices
included in the cycle. In this manner, the cycle can no longer be generated in any subsequent
iterations of the pricing problem. Then, the label-setting algorithm is restarted with the updated
neighbourhoods.
4.3 Heuristic labelling
Before calling the label-setting algorithm, we solve the pricing problem heuristically. If one or
multiple routes with negative reduced costs are found by the heuristic, the best ρH are added to
the RMP. Otherwise, the exact label-setting algorithm is used. As a heuristic, we use a modified
version of the label-setting algorithm, in which we only keep the label with the lowest reduced
cost in each bucket not belonging to the depot in order to reduce the number of potential labels.
4.4 Limited memory subset row cuts
The bound of the RMP can be improved by including valid inequalities. An effective family
of valid inequalities for the CVRP, which are also valid for our MP, are the limited memory
subset-row cuts (LM-SRCs) as introduced by Pecin et al. (2017a). These cuts provide a good
trade-off between computation time and strength of the cuts (Pecin et al., 2017b). They are
an extension of the subset-row cuts (SRCs ; Jepsen et al., 2008) which we briefly explain first.
Consider a fractional routing solution as visualised in Figure 4.1.
r3
r1
r2
1 2 3
4
Figure 4.1: Example of a fractional routing solution.
Suppose routes r1 = (0, 1, 2, 3, 0), r2 = (0, 3, 4, 0) and r3 = (0, 1, 4, 0) are all used 12 times in an
optimal solution to the RMP, where 0 denotes the depot. It is clear that these routes cannot be
included together in any integral optimal solution to the MP, which is prevented by including
SRCs. As is common, we limit ourselves to SRCs of size 3 with coefficient 12 . Given W ⊂ V ′ of
cardinality 3 and coefficient 12 , a SRC is formulated as
∑
r∈R
⌊
1
2
∑
v∈W
avr
⌋
xr ≤ 1. (4.2)
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The labelling algorithm has to be modified to deal with additional dual variables from the
inclusion of the SRC. An additional resource is added to a label for each included SRC and only
a weaker form of dominance can be applied (Pecin et al., 2017b). To reduce the computational
impact on the pricing algorithm, we consider the LM-SRC. Given W ⊂ V ′ such that |W | = 3,
a LM-SRC with coefficient 12 can be formulated as follows:∑
r∈R
α(W,M, r)xr ≤ 1, (4.3)
where M ⊆ V ′ is the memory set and the coefficient α is determined in the following iterative
manner. Set α = 0, consider the first customer v on route r, if v ∈W we increase α by 12 , else if
v ∈ V ′\M we set α = bαc, otherwise nothing happens. We repeat this process for each customer
in r in order of appearance. Consider the previous example again. Suppose that W = {1, 3, 4}
and M = {1, 3, 4}, it holds that α(W,M, r1) = 0 and α(W,M, r2) = α(W,M, r3) = 1. In
this case, the cut does not prohibit the fractional solution. However, setting M = {1, 2, 3, 4}
yields α(W,M, r1) = α(W,M, r2) = α(W,M, r3) = 1, which does cut off the fractional solution.
By increasing the size of the memory, the LM-SRCs become stronger at the cost of increased
computational effort.
To account for the inclusion of LM-SRCs, the label-setting algorithm is modified. Each label
is extended to hold an additional list of resources S consisting of resources Sω for each LM-SRC
ω ∈ Ω, where Ω consists of all LM-SRC identified so far for which the current associated dual σω is
non-zero and the current customer of the label is included in the memory set of ω. Furthermore,
when extending a label λ from vertex v to vertex w, we iterate over the resources in Ω. If w is
included in the customer set of the corresponding LM-SRC, the resource Sω is increased by 12 .
Then, if the resource is equal to 1, the resource value is reduced to 0 and the dual is subtracted
from the reduced cost of the label. Otherwise, if w is not included in the memory set of the
corresponding LM-SRC, the resource is also set to 0. Finally, the dominance rule is modified
(Pecin et al., 2017a). Consider two distinct labels λ = (C,D,U, S) and λ′ = (C ′, D′, U ′, S′).
Label λ dominates λ′ if the following condition holds:
C ≤ C ′ +
∑
ω∈Ω:Sω>S′ω
σω, (4.4)
along with conditions (3.10) and (4.1). We separate the LM-SRC by enumeration, once the MP
has been solved to optimality. To this end, we consider all subsets W ⊂ V ′ where |W | = 3,
∀ v, w ∈W , v ∈ Πw and w ∈ Πv. Given a subsetW , we generate a LM-SRC if the corresponding
SRC is violated by at least 0.1. Then M ⊆ V ′ is determined as follows. For each route included
in the current optimal solution, all customers between the first and second visit to a customer
in W are included in the memory. The same is done for any visited customer between the third
and fourth visit to a customer in W , and so on. For example, when considering Figure 4.1 once
more, one can see that route r1 requires customer 2 to be included in the memory.
5 Acceleration strategies for the row generation algorithm
In this section, we propose several acceleration strategies for the row generation algorithm. Note
that these acceleration strategies can also be applied to determine a core allocation for the VRG.
First, we present a relatively straightforward acceleration strategy after which we introduce the
two main acceleration strategies.
We store all columns which are generated by the row generation subproblem algorithm
in a column pool. Then, in each iteration of the row generation algorithm, the row generation
11
subproblem is initialised with all columns in the column pool. In this manner the row generation
subproblem is provided with a better initial solution at no additional computational cost.
Secondly, we propose an alternative row generation procedure. By relaxing the row genera-
tion subproblem to allow fractional route variables, a potentially violated rationality constraint
is identified. Then, the cost of the identified coalition is determined by solving a CVRP. The
aim of this method is to separate the identification of a violated constraint and the computation
of the right-hand side value, such that both procedures can be accelerated separately. This
procedure, which we call coarse row generation, is explained in detail in Section 5.1.
Thirdly, we propose to first generate rows heuristically to potentially reduce the number of
calls to the exact algorithm for the row generation subproblem. This procedure is elaborated
upon in Section 5.2.
Finally, in Section 5.3 we present an overview of the different variants of row generation
algorithms we consider, which follow from combining coarse and heuristic row generation.
5.1 Coarse row generation
Separating rationality constraints by solving the row generation subproblem to integer optimality
might be computationally intensive. Rather than modelling the vehicle routing cost exactly in
the row generation subproblem, we propose to use a lower bound on the routing cost. We
truncate the branching procedure, by no longer branching on the arc flow, to obtain this lower
bound. Effectively, we replace the routing cost C(S) of the row generation subproblem by the
lower bound C(S), where C(S) is given by the optimal objective value to the LP relaxation of
the set-covering formulation for the CVRP including LM-SRCs. We call this row generation
subproblem the coarse row generation subproblem, which can be formulated as follows:
max
S⊂N
(
y(S)− C(S)
)
. (5.1)
Note that maxS⊂N (y(S)− C(S)) ≤ maxS⊂N
(
y(S)− C(S)
)
. Hence, the coarse row generation
subproblem yields an upper bound for the row generation subproblem. Given a cost allocation
y, we call a coalition S ⊂ N potentially violated if
max
S⊂N
(
y(S)− C(S)
)
> 0.
Observe that a potentially violated coalition S ⊂ N does not necessarily correspond to a violated
rationality constraint. In order to asses this we need to determine the cost C(S) by solving a
CVRP.
This approach provides the opportunity to accelerate the procedure of solving CVRPs by
adding valid inequalities which we cannot add when solving the row generation subproblem. We
add the well-known rounded capacity cuts. For a given subset of customers W ⊆ V ′ such that
|W | ≥ 2, the rounded capacity cut is as follows:
∑
(v,w)∈A(N):v∈W,w 6∈W
[∑
r∈R
bvwr xr
]
≥
⌈∑
w∈W dw
Q
⌉
, (5.2)
where bvwr denotes whether route r uses arc (v, w) ∈ A. This valid inequality puts a lower bound
on the number of vehicles required to satisfy the demand of the customers in W . Note that, in
contrast to the LM-SRCs, the structure of the pricing problem is not altered by the inclusion of
the rounded capacity cuts.
We separate the rounded capacity cuts before separating the LM-SRC using the heuristic
separation algorithms by Lysgaard et al. (2004). After adding cuts, we solve the RMP again to
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optimality. Furthermore, we initialise the algorithm for the CVRP with the routes used in the
optimal solution to the relaxed row generation subproblem. As such, the root node has already
been solved and cuts can immediately be separated.
When branching to solve the coarse row generation subproblem, we may come across a
solution where the player variables z are integer with a non-negative objective value, before
finding the optimal solution to the coarse row generation subproblem. Rather than continuing
to branch, we solve the corresponding CVRP and add the corresponding rationality constraint.
If the constraint is not violated by the current solution, we continue branching. Otherwise, we
solve the relaxed EPM problem to obtain a new allocation or show that the core is empty.
After we add a rationality constraint, we also add an anti-cycling constraint to the coarse row
generation subproblem to prevent the algorithm from identifying the same constraint multiple
times. This can occur due to the use of the lower bound for the routing cost. Given a coalition
S ⊆ N , the anti-cycling constraint is as follows:∑
i∈S
zi −
∑
i∈S\N
zi ≤ |S| − 1. (5.3)
Note that the anti-cycling constraints are also added for coalitions S ⊆ N with |S| = 1 and the
grand-coalition, which are included at initialisation.
5.2 Heuristic row generation
In order to heuristically solve the (coarse) row generation subproblem, we solve the pricing
problem by only using the heuristic labelling algorithm as presented in Section 4.3. This leads
to an upper bound on the routing cost, and in turn a lower bound on the (coarse) row generation
subproblem. Hence, if a (potentially) violated rationality constraint is identified heuristically
for the (coarse) row generation subproblem, it is guaranteed to also be (potentially) violated
for the (coarse) row generation subproblem. However, as the heuristic gives a lower bound we
cannot guarantee that no violated coalition exists if none can be identified by the heuristic.
Hence, when the heuristic fails to find a violated coalition, we continue to solve the (coarse) row
generation subproblem to optimality.
5.3 Variants of the row generation algorithm
The strategies described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 can be applied and combined in multiple ways.
First, we consider the basic row generation procedure as described in Sections 3 and 4, denoted
by GENE . Note that this procedure does not include the acceleration methods proposed in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 but does include the column pool as mentioned at the start of Section
5. From now on, we will refer to the row generation subproblem as the regular subproblem to
be able to clearly distinguish it from the coarse row generation subproblem, which we will call
the coarse subproblem. We consider the row generation procedure GENC , which is similar to
GENE but only performs coarse row separation. Next, we consider the inclusion of heuristics
as described in Section 5.2. GENCH+EH+E denotes the procedure in which we first solve the
coarse subproblem heuristically. If no violated rationality is identified, we solve the regular
subproblem heuristically. If by doing so we cannot identify a violated rationality constraint,
we solve the regular subproblem to optimality. Finally, we consider the procedure denoted by
GENCH+EH+C which is similar to GENCH+EH+E but where the coarse subproblem is solved to
optimality instead of the regular subproblem. Note that all algorithms are guaranteed to give
an optimal solution to the EPM if the core is non-empty. A summary of all methods can be
found in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Solution methods for the row generation subproblem.
Abbreviation Description
GENE The regular subproblem is solved to optimality.
GENC The coarse subproblem is solved to optimality.
GENCH+EH+E
First, the coarse subproblem is solved heuristically, then the regular subproblem
is solved heuristically and finally the regular subproblem is solved to optimality.
GENCH+EH+C
First, the coarse subproblem is solved heuristically, then the regular subproblem
is solved heuristically and finally the coarse subproblem is solved to optimality.
6 Numerical Results
The algorithms were implemented in C++. We used IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimiser 12.7.1 to
solve all linear programming problems. The computations were conducted on a single core of
an AMD Ryzen 7 2700X @ 3.7 GHz with 16 GB of RAM.
The arc costs for the instances we consider are symmetric, so we branch on edge flows rather
than on arc flows. After each iteration of the (heuristic) pricing problem the best ρE = 10
(ρH = 20) negative reduced cost routes are added to the RMP. Furthermore, whenever we solve
a CVRP for coalition S ⊂ N we use the same implementation as used for the regular subproblem
by solving GCPTP(0) while setting zi = 1 for every i ∈ S and zi = 0 for N\S. Moreover, we
now also include the rounded capacity cuts. For every instance and algorithm, a computation
time limit of 2 hours is used.
6.1 Problem instances
We generate instances of the JNVRG based on CVRP benchmark instances from the literature.
To this end, we consider the A-set of Augerat (1995) and the Solomon instances C101-100
and C201-100 as introduced by Solomon (1987). We select these instances to consider both
non-clustered and clustered instances, which could influence the difficulty to determine a core
allocation. We modify the instances as follows. We consider 5, 10 and 15 players for each of the
instances. Given the number of players n we assign customer i to player (i mod n) + 1. For the
Solomon instances, this creates clusters in which customers of different players are included.
From the Augerat A-set we create JNVRG instances including all customers. However,
from each Solomon instance we generate multiple JNVRG instances that contain a subset of
customers. For each Solomon instance, we create 5 instances of 20 customers, 3 instances of 33
customers and 2 instances of 50 customers, where we split the customers of the original instance
in equal sets starting with the first customer. For example, when considering 33 customers, the
first set consists of customers 1 through 33, whereas the second set consists of customers 34
through 66. Additionally, we create instances of the VRG. They are the same as the JNVRG
instances, but modified such that each individual customer corresponds to a separate player.
6.2 Numerical results for the JNVRG
We introduce an additional algorithm COREE to serve as a benchmark. This algorithm enu-
merates all coalitions, solves the corresponding CVRPs and then determines an EPM allocation
by solving (2.4)-(2.9). Obviously, this method is not tractable when the number of players is
high.
The results of our numerical experiments on the JNVRG instances are given in Tables 6.1
and 6.2 for the Augerat instances and Solomon instances, respectively. The first column provides
the name of the instance. The column n provides the number of players and the column |V ′|
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provides the number of customers. The column C indicates whether the core is empty (E),
non-empty (NE) or whether it is unknown (?) because the algorithm reached the time limit of 2
hours. For each of the algorithms the number of generated constraints is reported in the column
m, where the number in between brackets represents the number of generated constraints which
were actually violated, excluding the grand-coalition and singleton rationality constraints used
at initialisation. The column T provides the total time spent in seconds to determine an EPM
allocation, and the column TRG represents the percentage of time which was spent on solving
the row generation subproblem. For each instance, the fastest solution time has been made
bold. Note that the Augerat instances A-n53-k07 to A-n80-k10 have been omitted from Table
6.1 as not many of these instances could be solved within a time limit of two hours. The results
on these instances are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix and are not considered in the
remainder of this section. Note that among these instances, the largest we could solve has 5
players and 79 customers.
Using the enumerative algorithm COREE , 23 out of the 52 Augerat instances and 27 out
of the 60 Solomon instances for the JNVRG were solved. By using this algorithm, almost all
instances consisting of 5 players could be solved. However, only 19 out of 34 instances consisting
of 10 players could be solved and no instance consisting of 15 players could be solved within
the time limit. This clearly demonstrates that enumerating all coalitions is not tractable even
for a moderate number of players. With the different variants of the row generation algorithms
we are able to solve significantly more instances. Using the basic row generation algorithm
GENE we could solve a total of 77 instances, 27 more than with the enumerative algorithm,
which demonstrates the effectiveness of the row generation procedure. The other variants of the
algorithms GENC , GENCH+EH+E and GENCH+EH+C could solve 81, 89 and 88 instances out
of the 112 instances, respectively. Note that the row generation algorithms are able to solve
significantly more of both the 10 player and 15 player instances.
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Table 6.1: Numerical results on the JNVRG instances of the Augerat A-set.
COREE GENE GENC GENCH+EH+E GENCH+EH+C
Instance n |V ′| C T m T TI m T TI m T TI m T TI
A-n32-k05 5 31 NE 30 2 (2) 1014 99 2 (2) 32 74 2 (2) 23 62 2 (2) 23 62
A-n32-k05 10 31 NE 1239 4 (4) 1867 100 20 (5) 628 86 16 (5) 197 70 20 (5) 338 80
A-n32-k05 15 31 NE 7200 7200 7200 117 (20) 2191 74 120 (20) 3058 80
A-n33-k06 5 32 NE 45 0 (0) 22 75 1 (0) 20 66 1 (0) 15 55 1 (0) 15 56
A-n33-k06 10 32 NE 1702 5 (5) 818 99 20 (8) 870 56 16 (7) 676 21 17 (8) 685 29
A-n33-k06 15 32 NE 7200 13 (13) 2009 100 45 (16) 2257 90 46 (20) 531 73 54 (20) 795 78
A-n34-k05 5 33 NE 179 0 (0) 41 85 2 (0) 41 72 2 (0) 23 54 2 (0) 23 54
A-n34-k05 10 33 E 1606 11 (11) 3963 100 12 (7) 449 42 12 (9) 71 5 12 (9) 71 5
A-n34-k05 15 33 E 7200 14 (14) 2585 100 27 (22) 1305 76 26 (26) 145 11 26 (26) 146 11
A-n36-k05 5 35 NE 149 2 (2) 1017 99 2 (2) 100 30 2 (2) 77 37 2 (2) 80 36
A-n36-k05 10 35 NE 4038 7 (7) 1786 99 17 (8) 840 74 17 (7) 743 73 16 (7) 585 62
A-n36-k05 15 35 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n37-k05 5 36 NE 71 0 (0) 34 72 0 (0) 34 72 0 (0) 32 71 0 (0) 33 71
A-n37-k05 10 36 NE 5937 1 (1) 2244 100 5 (2) 332 88 5 (2) 176 73 5 (2) 178 73
A-n37-k05 15 36 NE 7200 7200 7200 48 (15) 2280 47 55 (15) 4581 36
A-n37-k06 5 36 NE 496 0 (0) 475 3 0 (0) 473 3 0 (0) 476 3 0 (0) 478 3
A-n37-k06 10 36 NE 6048 5 (5) 1516 80 14 (5) 1556 34 14 (5) 1216 22 14 (5) 1124 30
A-n37-k06 15 36 NE 7200 7200 7200 108 (24) 6317 40 94 (21) 5859 59
A-n38-k05 5 37 NE 265 0 (0) 238 16 1 (0) 228 11 0 (0) 235 15 1 (0) 230 11
A-n38-k05 10 37 NE 2212 7200 15 (3) 915 66 11 (4) 461 36 15 (4) 504 38
A-n38-k05 15 37 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n39-k05 5 38 NE 441 0 (0) 257 13 1 (0) 265 12 0 (0) 259 13 1 (0) 267 12
A-n39-k05 10 38 NE 7200 7200 7200 10 (7) 1423 21 7200
A-n39-k05 15 38 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n39-k06 5 38 NE 268 0 (0) 149 23 2 (0) 219 20 0 (0) 153 25 2 (0) 219 20
A-n39-k06 10 38 NE 2916 6 (6) 1539 91 18 (7) 1053 48 17 (8) 691 27 19 (8) 837 37
A-n39-k06 15 38 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n44-k06 5 43 NE 308 0 (0) 34 64 0 (0) 35 64 0 (0) 34 64 0 (0) 35 64
A-n44-k06 10 43 NE 7200 5 (5) 2927 100 30 (7) 4440 58 27 (4) 2306 33 30 (8) 2797 35
A-n44-k06 15 43 NE 7200 7200 7200 53 (16) 4608 47 51 (14) 6278 54
A-n45-k06 5 44 NE 207 0 (0) 94 32 1 (0) 107 34 0 (0) 93 31 1 (0) 106 34
A-n45-k06 10 44 NE 5459 2 (2) 2094 97 15 (2) 1661 69 3 (2) 614 87 15 (2) 1131 41
A-n45-k06 15 44 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n45-k07 5 44 NE 322 1 (1) 819 88 1 (1) 155 32 1 (1) 820 88 1 (1) 156 32
A-n45-k07 10 44 NE 7200 7200 7200 43 (13) 6293 19 44 (13) 5823 23
A-n45-k07 15 44 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n46-k07 5 45 NE 143 7200 1 (1) 77 75 1 (1) 68 65 1 (1) 68 66
A-n46-k07 10 45 NE 7200 7200 20 (7) 2354 91 17 (7) 956 78 18 (7) 986 77
A-n46-k07 15 45 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n48-k07 5 47 NE 828 0 (0) 307 91 2 (0) 177 50 0 (0) 305 91 2 (0) 154 43
A-n48-k07 10 47 NE 7200 2 (2) 6569 100 7200 19 (3) 4804 30 22 (3) 5740 20
A-n48-k07 15 47 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
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Table 6.2: Results on the JNVRG Solomon instances.
COREE GENE GENC GENCH+EH+E GENCH+EH+C
Instance n |V ′| C T m T TI m T TI m T TI m T TI
C101-0 5 20 NE 19 0 (0) 13 66 0 (0) 13 66 0 (0) 13 66 0 (0) 13 66
C101-1 5 20 NE 9 1 (1) 11 77 2 (1) 14 76 1 (1) 9 66 2 (1) 12 71
C101-2 5 20 NE 28 0 (0) 21 53 0 (0) 21 53 0 (0) 21 53 0 (0) 21 53
C101-3 5 20 NE 25 0 (0) 14 38 0 (0) 14 38 0 (0) 14 38 0 (0) 13 38
C101-4 5 20 NE 10 0 (0) 5 64 0 (0) 5 64 0 (0) 5 64 0 (0) 5 64
C101-0 10 20 NE 448 1 (1) 47 85 1 (1) 53 75 1 (1) 37 80 1 (1) 42 69
C101-1 10 20 E 252 8 (8) 81 98 10 (10) 39 81 13 (13) 11 11 13 (13) 11 11
C101-2 10 20 NE 593 0 (0) 24 27 0 (0) 24 27 0 (0) 24 27 0 (0) 24 27
C101-3 10 20 NE 617 2 (2) 77 91 12 (4) 148 77 5 (2) 58 73 13 (4) 92 59
C101-4 10 20 NE 250 1 (1) 9 80 1 (1) 11 76 1 (1) 10 73 1 (1) 10 73
C101-0 15 20 NE 7200 1 (1) 147 98 3 (1) 286 95 1 (1) 160 98 3 (1) 195 88
C101-1 15 20 E 7200 9 (9) 123 98 16 (16) 64 82 14 (14) 11 13 14 (14) 11 13
C101-2 15 20 NE 7200 6 (6) 1966 99 13 (9) 2786 98 13 (9) 980 94 13 (9) 1166 96
C101-3 15 20 NE 7200 2 (2) 201 98 67 (3) 1369 88 19 (2) 193 69 67 (3) 507 62
C101-4 15 20 NE 7200 1 (1) 28 95 1 (1) 32 93 1 (1) 32 91 1 (1) 31 91
C101-0 5 33 NE 100 0 (0) 135 69 1 (0) 151 64 0 (0) 135 68 1 (0) 145 62
C101-1 5 33 NE 116 0 (0) 27 26 0 (0) 27 27 0 (0) 27 27 0 (0) 27 26
C101-2 5 33 NE 56 0 (0) 20 57 0 (0) 20 57 0 (0) 21 57 0 (0) 20 57
C101-0 10 33 E 7200 7200 13 (9) 5437 14 12 (10) 4370 11 11 (10) 2677 13
C101-1 10 33 NE 7200 0 (0) 111 77 6 (0) 198 72 0 (0) 112 77 6 (0) 173 68
C101-2 10 33 NE 1322 1 (1) 97 90 2 (1) 111 82 1 (1) 103 90 2 (1) 106 81
C101-0 15 33 E 7200 7200 14 (13) 1397 48 10 (10) 1115 18 13 (13) 812 27
C101-1 15 33 NE 7200 3 (3) 438 97 19 (3) 633 78 12 (3) 283 73 19 (3) 427 67
C101-2 15 33 NE 7200 3 (3) 400 98 6 (4) 513 92 7 (5) 478 93 8 (5) 437 88
C101-0 5 50 NE 549 0 (0) 304 54 0 (0) 305 54 0 (0) 307 54 0 (0) 305 54
C101-1 5 50 NE 368 0 (0) 269 20 0 (0) 269 20 0 (0) 270 20 0 (0) 268 20
C101-0 10 50 NE 7200 0 (0) 232 36 0 (0) 233 36 0 (0) 234 36 0 (0) 233 36
C101-1 10 50 NE 6588 2 (2) 1233 83 10 (2) 1501 67 10 (2) 1205 64 10 (2) 1148 58
C101-0 15 50 NE 7200 1 (1) 3519 96 1 (1) 3501 96 1 (1) 3249 96 1 (1) 3147 95
C101-1 15 50 NE 7200 7200 7200 30 (6) 3013 66 40 (8) 3408 65
C201-0 5 20 NE 161 0 (0) 54 42 0 (0) 54 42 0 (0) 54 42 0 (0) 54 42
C201-1 5 20 NE 64 1 (1) 58 43 1 (1) 69 33 1 (1) 61 45 1 (1) 70 34
C201-2 5 20 NE 134 0 (0) 39 61 0 (0) 39 61 0 (0) 39 61 0 (0) 39 61
C201-3 5 20 NE 204 0 (0) 65 37 0 (0) 65 38 0 (0) 65 38 0 (0) 65 38
C201-4 5 20 NE 115 0 (0) 91 27 0 (0) 91 27 0 (0) 92 27 0 (0) 91 27
C201-0 10 20 NE 1391 2 (2) 81 70 2 (2) 1080 3 2 (2) 1065 2 2 (2) 1072 2
C201-1 10 20 NE 1146 1 (1) 46 31 1 (1) 68 17 2 (2) 63 23 2 (2) 63 23
C201-2 10 20 NE 7200 0 (0) 47 55 0 (0) 47 55 0 (0) 47 55 0 (0) 47 55
C201-3 10 20 NE 7200 1 (1) 66 27 1 (1) 102 19 1 (1) 66 27 1 (1) 101 18
C201-4 10 20 NE 4351 0 (0) 60 22 0 (0) 60 22 0 (0) 60 23 0 (0) 60 22
C201-0 15 20 NE 7200 3 (3) 161 55 3 (3) 258 42 4 (4) 193 56 4 (4) 251 37
C201-1 15 20 NE 7200 1 (1) 75 79 1 (1) 106 67 1 (1) 121 55 1 (1) 121 55
C201-2 15 20 NE 7200 0 (0) 26 44 0 (0) 25 44 0 (0) 26 44 0 (0) 26 43
C201-3 15 20 NE 7200 1 (1) 54 51 1 (1) 145 19 1 (1) 54 52 1 (1) 145 19
C201-4 15 20 NE 7200 1 (1) 208 56 1 (1) 210 55 1 (1) 180 49 1 (1) 183 48
C201-0 5 33 NE 4620 0 (0) 763 32 0 (0) 767 31 0 (0) 766 31 0 (0) 765 31
C201-1 5 33 NE 7200 0 (0) 855 33 0 (0) 856 33 0 (0) 856 33 0 (0) 857 33
C201-2 5 33 NE 3321 0 (0) 2777 42 0 (0) 2810 41 0 (0) 2803 41 0 (0) 2773 42
C201-0 10 33 NE 7200 0 (0) 672 27 0 (0) 675 27 0 (0) 675 27 0 (0) 672 27
C201-1 10 33 NE 7200 0 (0) 1393 85 0 (0) 1398 85 0 (0) 1399 85 0 (0) 1390 85
C201-2 10 33 NE 7200 0 (0) 2420 77 0 (0) 2463 77 0 (0) 2454 77 0 (0) 2431 77
C201-0 15 33 NE 7200 2 (2) 400 20 2 (2) 1914 4 2 (2) 483 34 2 (2) 1912 5
C201-1 15 33 NE 7200 1 (1) 1843 70 1 (1) 6094 21 1 (1) 1884 70 1 (1) 5985 21
C201-2 15 33 NE 7200 0 (0) 648 30 0 (0) 651 30 0 (0) 651 30 0 (0) 648 30
C201-0 5 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-1 5 50 NE 7200 0 (0) 3613 41 0 (0) 3626 41 0 (0) 3627 41 0 (0) 3609 41
C201-0 10 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-1 10 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-0 15 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-1 15 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
When comparing run times between two algorithms, we compare the total time taken to solve
all instances which have been solved using both algorithms. When considering the 5 player
instances, the row generation algorithm GENE , GENC , GENCH+EH+E and GENCH+EH+C are
47%, 104%, 87% and 108% faster than COREE , respectively. On the 10 player instances, the row
generation algorithms are 161% to 543% faster than the enumerative algorithm. For all Augerat
instances, GENC was 61% faster than GENE , which shows the effectiveness of the coarse row
generation. Furthermore, GENCH+EH+E was 134% faster whereas GENCH+EH+C was 112%
faster than GENE on all Augerat instances, which demonstrates the effectiveness of solving
the (coarse) subproblem problem heuristically. However, on the Solomon instances, GENE was
38% and 23% faster than GENC and GENCH+EH+C , respectively, and only 1% slower than
GENCH+EH+E . This result can be explained by the low number of rationality constraints
which are generated in the Solomon instances in comparison to the Augerat instances. This low
number of generated rationality constraints can be attributed to the structure of the Solomon
instances. These instances contain clusters consisting of customers of different players, making a
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collaboration highly profitable, and as a result, any efficient and individually rational allocation
is likely to lie in the core.
In general, the row generation algorithms GENCH+EH+E and GENCH+EH+C solved the
most instances in the least amount of time. Comparing both algorithms on the 5 player instances
solved by both algorithms, GENCH+EH+C was on average 7% faster. On the 10 players instances
both algorithms were equally fast. Finally, on the 15 player instances, GENCH+EH+E was on
average 38% faster.
6.3 Numerical Results for the VRG
The results of our numerical experiments for the VRG instances are given in Tables 6.3 and
6.4 for the Augerat instances and Solomon instances, respectively. Note that COREE is not
included in the results as the algorithm is no longer tractable for these high number of players.
When considering the Augerat instances, using the row generation algorithms GENE , GENC ,
GENCH+EH+E and GENCH+EH+C we could solve a total of 6, 10, 14 and 16 out of 17 instances,
respectively. Moreover, GENCH+EH+E and GENCH+EH+C were on these instances 1714%
and 1728% faster than GENE , respectively. Again these results illustrate the effectiveness
of the coarse row generation as well as heuristic row generation, also for the VRG. We find
similar results for the Solomon instances, using the row generation algorithms GENE , GENC ,
GENCH+EH+E and GENCH+EH+C we could solve a total of 12, 12, 14 and 13 out of 20 instances,
respectively. We were not able to solve any of the instances based on the Solomon instance C201
with 33 players or more. This may be attributed to the high vehicle capacity for these instances,
when compared to the customer demand. As a result, most customers can be visited on a single
distribution route. Our column generation algorithm is not suitable for these instances, as the
computation time of the labelling algorithm used to solve the pricing problem becomes high in
the case of many customers on one route.
Table 6.3: The results on given instances for the different varieties of the row generation algo-
rithm.
GENE GENC GENCH+EH+E GENCH+EH+C
Instance n |V ′| C m T TI m T TI m T TI m T TI
A-n32-k05 31 31 E 54 (54) 1239 100 42 (42) 281 86 52 (52) 50 7 52 (52) 50 7
A-n33-k06 32 32 E 71 (71) 1410 99 64 (64) 330 86 68 (68) 49 8 68 (68) 49 8
A-n34-k05 33 33 E 41 (41) 2721 100 52 (52) 662 94 42 (41) 39 15 47 (47) 43 16
A-n36-k05 35 35 E 7200 60 (60) 1691 93 85 (85) 227 6 85 (85) 222 6
A-n37-k05 36 36 E 51 (51) 3660 100 59 (59) 1010 89 56 (56) 118 6 56 (56) 114 6
A-n37-k06 36 36 E 7200 69 (69) 3717 83 7200 119 (119) 935 32
A-n38-k05 37 37 E 45 (45) 1954 90 44 (44) 983 74 52 (52) 254 3 52 (52) 250 3
A-n39-k05 38 38 E 7200 48 (48) 1734 75 48 (48) 321 6 48 (48) 316 7
A-n39-k06 38 38 E 54 (54) 5232 95 48 (48) 1114 70 76 (76) 384 2 76 (76) 381 2
A-n44-k06 43 43 E 7200 7200 171 (171) 319 13 185 (185) 344 15
A-n45-k06 44 44 E 7200 91 (91) 4329 94 70 (70) 224 4 70 (70) 216 4
A-n45-k07 44 44 E 7200 7200 7200 149 (149) 1481 65
A-n46-k07 45 45 E 7200 7200 225 (225) 508 9 225 (225) 490 9
A-n48-k07 47 47 E 7200 7200 267 (267) 612 9 278 (278) 643 12
A-n53-k07 52 52 E 7200 7200 225 (223) 2762 26 225 (223) 2709 26
A-n54-k07 53 53 E 7200 7200 165 (165) 2978 32 174 (174) 2460 17
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Table 6.4: Numerical Results on the VRG solomon instances.
GENE GENC GENCH+EH+E GENCH+EH+C
Instance n |V ′| C m T TI m T TI m T TI m T TI
C101-0 20 20 NE 99 (99) 1102 99 80 (80) 343 89 52 (52) 66 37 37 (37) 95 78
C101-1 20 20 E 21 (21) 168 99 15 (15) 26 73 16 (16) 10 7 16 (16) 9 7
C101-2 20 20 NE 16 (16) 696 98 17 (17) 627 93 16 (16) 347 88 15 (15) 406 89
C101-3 20 20 E 64 (64) 193 96 66 (66) 70 63 63 (59) 37 14 60 (59) 51 15
C101-4 20 20 NE 4 (4) 6 73 4 (4) 10 58 3 (3) 5 34 3 (3) 5 32
C101-0 33 33 E 12 (12) 1053 95 14 (14) 379 57 27 (27) 263 42 19 (19) 188 14
C101-1 33 33 E 7200 7200 50 (49) 253 6 50 (49) 271 5
C101-2 33 33 E 92 (92) 1575 99 80 (80) 1047 62 126 (123) 664 24 136 (135) 486 10
C101-0 50 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
C101-1 50 50 E 7200 7200 96 (96) 1489 -000 96 (96) 1489 -000
C201-0 20 20 NE 7 (7) 255 91 7 (7) 562 50 8 (8) 274 69 8 (8) 338 58
C201-1 20 20 NE 5 (5) 125 74 6 (6) 207 37 5 (5) 104 35 5 (5) 133 21
C201-2 20 20 NE 1 (1) 54 33 1 (1) 89 18 1 (1) 54 33 1 (1) 89 18
C201-3 20 20 NE 1 (1) 76 79 3 (3) 212 31 1 (1) 75 79 7200
C201-4 20 20 NE 2 (2) 443 91 3 (3) 474 88 3 (3) 399 86 3 (3) 364 83
C201-0 33 33 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-1 33 33 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-2 33 33 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-0 50 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
C201-1 50 50 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
7 Concluding remarks
We presented a row generation algorithm to allocate costs for instances of the JNVRG with
a large number of players. Furthermore, we proposed coarse and heuristic row generation to
accelerate our algorithm. The results of our numerical experiments suggest that the proposed
row generation algorithm is effective for the JNVRG as well as for the VRG, as we can determine
core allocations for instances ranging from 5 players and 79 customers to instances of 53 players
and 53 customers, within 2 hours of computation time.
In practice, companies may have more delivery locations than we can currently solve with our
algorithm. It requires further research to design a methodology for these cases. Furthermore,
observe that our algorithm applies to settings in which the depots of the companies are the
same or located near each other. However, in practice this might not be the case. Similarly,
time windows or other case specific features could impact the routing cost. Further research is
required to determine the effectiveness of row generation for these cases.
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Appendix
A Remaining results on the Augerat instances
Table A.1: Results on the remaining Augerat instances.
COREE GENE GENC GENCH+EH+E GENCH+EH+C
Instance n |V ′| C T m T TI m T TI m T TI m T TI
A-n53-k07 5 52 NE 3546 0 (0) 1368 48 3 (0) 2223 9 0 (0) 1291 44 3 (0) 1586 9
A-n53-k07 10 52 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n53-k07 15 52 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n54-k07 5 53 NE 4410 0 (0) 1082 11 1 (0) 1102 10 0 (0) 1084 11 1 (0) 1108 9
A-n54-k07 10 53 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n54-k07 15 53 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n55-k09 5 54 NE 1161 0 (0) 862 10 1 (0) 859 9 0 (0) 861 10 1 (0) 868 9
A-n55-k09 10 54 NE 7200 7200 14 (5) 4425 69 13 (5) 2620 47 13 (5) 2881 38
A-n55-k09 15 54 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n55-k09 54 54 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n60-k09 5 59 NE 7200 0 (0) 5543 28 2 (0) 4383 5 0 (0) 5574 28 2 (0) 4358 4
A-n60-k09 10 59 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n60-k09 15 59 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n60-k09 59 59 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n61-k09 5 60 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n61-k09 10 60 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n61-k09 15 60 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n61-k09 60 60 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n62-k08 5 61 NE 7200 0 (0) 4123 3 7200 0 (0) 4150 3 7200
A-n62-k08 10 61 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n62-k08 15 61 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n62-k08 61 61 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k09 5 62 NE 7200 0 (0) 768 54 1 (0) 886 14 0 (0) 766 54 1 (0) 887 14
A-n63-k09 10 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k09 15 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k09 62 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k10 5 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k10 10 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k10 15 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n63-k10 62 62 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n64-k09 5 63 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n64-k09 10 63 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n64-k09 15 63 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n65-k09 5 64 NE 3592 7200 3 (1) 787 31 7200 3 (1) 746 25
A-n65-k09 10 64 NE 7200 7200 11 (2) 4304 41 7200 11 (2) 4995 21
A-n65-k09 15 64 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n69-k09 5 68 NE 7200 0 (0) 4864 3 1 (0) 7157 3 0 (0) 4934 3 7200
A-n69-k09 10 68 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n69-k09 15 68 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n80-k10 5 79 NE 7200 0 (0) 6586 7 7200 0 (0) 6658 6 7200
A-n80-k10 10 79 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
A-n80-k10 15 79 ? 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
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